[Vol.71:1017 in terms of private preferences, approvals or pleasures together with the quantitative notion of the majority of people.
Several implications of this theory of law have not received the attention they deserve. First, legal justice, as distinct from private morals, is made a mere question of numbers. From this it follows that should there be nothing concerning some particular legal dispute between two people about which the majority of people in the legal system agree in their approval or disapproval, the concept of what is legally just with respect to this dispute is meaningless. Second, the Anglo-American judge's use of past precedents to arrive at a legal decision of which the majority of people today disapprove should not exist. Third, the traditional American legal practice of declaring majority-approved legislative statutes illegal if their substantive content is incompatible with the right of a single dissenter to a religious or political belief that affronts the legislative and popular majority also becomes meaningless. Certainly, if to say that "x is legally just" is equivalent to saying that "x is approved by the majority," then, as the legal positivists Hobbes and Austin saw, to talk about a majority-approved statute being illegal is to affirm a contradiction. It is a tribute to the integrity of Judge Hand, if not to the adequacy of his positivistic linguistic, moral and legal philosophy, that he accepted this consequence of positivism in law, language and morals. In his article on "Chief Justice Stone's Concept of the Judicial Function," Judge Hand tells us that the Bill of Rights is to be interpreted not as law, but merely as morals or "admonitions to forbearance"5 to the legislators and the electorate which, if they do not follow, "a judge of integrity" (a judge holding Judge Hand's positivistic legal philosophy) can do nothing to redress.
A fourth consequence is that even if the majority agree on what they approve, prefer or find pleasing, this theory of law leaves meaningless the obligation of everyone else in the legal system to be judged by what the majority approve. In short, this conception of law cannot resolve what the writer elsewhere has called the "problem of legal inductions the problem of passing from approved by the majority to obligatory for everyone in the legal system. Just as Judge Hand has noted, quite correctly, that "x is morally good," i.e., "preferred by me" is quite a different thing from "x is legally just," i.e., "preferred by the majority of people in the legal system," so the latter is different from and cannot give meaning to "x is legally obligatory for everyone in the legal system." Austin's attempt, in his classic definition of law, to meet this difficulty, by appeal to the materialistic club of Hobbes' political sovereign, will not do for three reasons: First, Hobbes' physical club is that of a natural law materialistically metaphysical theory, and, as shown above, for any moral and legal radically empirical positivist, a naturalistic, i.e., an empirical, theory of the meaning of normative words exists in morals and is meaningless for law, as any metaphysics, be it materialistic or spiritual, is similarly meaningless.
5. HAND, op. cit. supra note 1, at 204. Second, the club of the political sovereign, which is capable of bringing pain or evil to bear on anyone who disapproves of what the majority approve, must be, as it was for Hobbes, a naturalistic public object in the space and time of physical science, which is bigger than the similar clubs of anyone else in the community. But such a public object, to be meaningful, requires a realistic theory of the meaning of words, as again Hobbes well knew, and the realistic theory is not warranted by the epistemological premise ( It does not follow, however, that an adequate theory of the relation between law, morals and language is to be found in the writings of these men. A reading of their works will show that they are still heavily under the influence of British radically empirical moral and linguistic theory and especially that recent version of it represented by I. A. Richards and the later Wittgenstein. In other words, they are still Austinian positivists so far as their theory of language and much of their theory of morals are concerned and have merely replaced the Austinian legal premise (IL)BE above with that of Kelsen in order to make the concept of legal obligation meaningful. The result is a legal, moral and linguistic confusion instead of an adequate theory, as the following considerations show: (1) As was indicated in our determination above of the relation between morals, language and law in Judge Hand's legal theory, the Austinian positivist's legal postulate is required by (a) his radically empirical epistemological premise and (b) the moral postulate which it in turn entails. (2) Kelsen's legal positivism, because of its neo-Kantian epistemological as-7. HUME, op. cit. supra note 4, at 245-46. 8. KELSEN What direction must this change take? It will help to find the answer if we summarize the three major points at which the traditional Anglo-American legal positivism fails. First, its Austinian and Hobbesian concept of the sanction for positive law is false on two grounds: (a) its appeal to Hobbes' materialistic club rests upon a naive realistic theory of the meaning of language, and naive realism is incompatible with positivism, and (b) as Hume, the greatest of linguistic positivists showed, and Kant and Kelsen reconfirmed, no "is" however big and absolutely painful can give an "ought," be it a moral or a legal obligation. Second, Austinian legal positivism leaves meaningless the obligation of any and everyone in any legal system, rather than merely the majority who approve a particular positive legal rule, to be legally judged by the norms of the legal system. Third, it provides no legal meaning, though it does provide a moral meaning, for the right of a person to his own religious, political or nonnormative scientific belief when that belief is disapproved or not preferred by or not pleasing to the majority of the people and their officially elected representatives. This follows, let it be recalled, from the legal postulate (IL)"E above. If "x is legally just" is equivalent to "x is what the majority approve," then it is self-contradictory to talk about anything that the majority approve being unjust.
NORTHROP, THE COMPLEXITY OF LEGAL AND ETHICAL EXPERIENCE ch. 22 (1959).
Since our concern is with morals as well as law, it is important to note that this unfortunate consequence of Austinian legal positivism with respect to the legal protection of religious and political dissenters from what the majority disapprove, is a consequence of the positivist's theory of morals, quite apart from their legal postulate (IL)RE. Such is the case because their moral premise (IM) locates the normative value of anything, not in the substantive content of the object x that is evaluated, but solely in the radically empirical, introspective psychological experience of the evaluator. As Hume wrote, Take any action allow'd to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance [t]he vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till you turn your reflection into your own breast.... It lies in yourself, not in the object.'O Forthwith, it becomes meaningless for the moral value of anything to turn on its substantive content, if, as occurs in judicial review, a majority-approved legislative statute is judged with respect to the legality of its substantive content. This is why Judge Learned Hand is correct when he sees that a consistent Austinian legal positivist, what he calls a "judge of integrity," must interpret the language of the Bill of Rights as moral exhortation rather than as law. This also is what Judge Hand means when he adds, in the aforementioned article on Mr. Justice Stone, that there is no difference in this respect between majority-approved statutes affecting personal rights and those involving property rights or New Deal social legislation. If the meaning of morals as well as of law is not in the substantive content of what is judged but in "your own breast," this is true. Certainly, if "x is good" or "x is just" is equivalent to "x being approved," then approval is justice and what is approved is irrelevant. Clearly, Hume's conception of morals has legal implications which Judge Hand expresses in his theory of judicial review and in his interpretation of the language of the Bill of Rights in the American legal system.
SOME RECENT ALTERNATIVES TO TRADITIONAL ANGLO-AMERICAN MORAL AND LEGAL POSITIVISM
It is generally accepted by the majority of contemporary analytic philosophers and British lawyers, such as those mentioned above, that the identification of the meaning of the normative words "good" and "bad" in personal morals with the radically empirical data of introspective psychology, such as the "pleasure" and "pain" of Locke, Bentham and Austin, Hume's "approvals" or Judge Hand's "arbitrary preferences" commits what the late Professor G. E. Moore called "the naturalistic fallacy."" The gist of this fallacy consists in pointing out that such a theory entails that the propositions "pleasure is good," "my preference is good" or "what I approve is good" are equivalent to the trivial tautologies "pleasure is pleasure," "my preference is my preference" or "what I approve is what I approve"; whereas, clearly, when one predicates the word "good" of anything, one is affirming something more than such a trivial tautology. In short, sentences in which any normative word is predicated of any empirical fact are clearly synthetic, i.e., the predicate term means more than the subject term. Since the moral and legal theory of Hume, Bentham, Austin, Hobbes, Holmes and Judge Hand has the consequence of making such sentences analytic, their theory is false.
Moore's own theory of personal morality throws additional light on the relation between law and language. Due to his realistic theory of the meaning of words, he asserted that there are objects of human knowledge which are the [Vol.71:1017 same for all knowers and which, therefore, are not relative to particular percipients and evaluators after the manner of all items of knowledge in a radically empirical epistemology. This theory made it meaningful for Moore to interpret the meaning of the word "good" in personal morals as referring to a nonempirical, realistic, ethical property which is the same for all knowers and incapable of further analysis. The reason why it is both nonempirical and unanalyzable into empirical factors such as pleasure, or approval or preference is that, otherwise, the naturalistic fallacy occurs.
Essential to Moore's theory is his distinction between "intrinsically good" and "instrumentally good." A "good "is intrinsic when its goodness depends on nothing other than itself. A "good" is instrumental if its goodness depends on its efficacy in achieving intrinsic goodness. Only intrinsic goodness is nonempirical and not further analyzable. Since this means that it is known immediately or intuitively, this theory has been called the "intuitive theory" of morals. Expressed with analytic precision, this theory (lM)I, where the superscript I means the intuitive theory, therefore, is:
(lM)' For any person p and for any object or moral judgment x, to say that x is intrinsically good is equivalent to saying that x is characterized by a nonempirical, unanalyzable ethical predicate 4' where 4' is a realistic epistemological property the same for all knowers.
This entails the consequence that all normative subjects, and hence law as well as morals, contain at least one basic concept which is autonomous and which, therefore, does not define away, after the manner of Austinian legal positivism, sociological jurisprudence and some American legal realists, in terms of the empirical data of any empirical science. The words "realistic epistemological property" in moral assumption (lM)' express the fact that just as the Austinian legal positivist's theory of what the word "good" means requires a radical empirical theory of the meaning of language for its justification, so Moore's theory of morals assumes a realistic epistemological theory of the meaning of both descriptive and intrinsic evaluative language. The difference between these two theories of the meaning of any word is, therefore, important.
Realism is the linguistic theory that words do not require the particular observer or evaluator to be specified, for any descriptive or evaluative statement to be meaningful. This is why in (lM)I the phrase "as judged by a particular p" does not appear. In descriptive common-sense judgments or natural science, realism means that we know objects and laws invariant or the same for all observers or physical frames of reference, which exist independently of any particular perceiver being present. By way of contrast, radical empiricism entails the thesis, as Galilei, Newton, Bishop Berkely and Hume showed, that it is meaningless to make either a descriptive or evaluative statement without specifying the particular perceiver or the evaluator for whom the statement is true. This is the point of Bishop Berkeley's famous state- meaning of all normative words "normatively ambiguous" and the meaning of all legal language dependent on a "policy decision," rests on two errors: The first is the failure to realize that science contains constitutively introduced concepts as well as instrumentally defined ones. The second is the failure to distinguish in morals and law between the intrinsically good and just and instrumental goodness and justice. This does not mean that the instrumental role of law is not very great or not prodigiously important. But its presence and importance arise from the fact that morals and law are not merely handmaids to some other subject, but contain one autonomous, intrinsic goal value of their own. Consequently, to be a properly trained lawyer or a judge of integrity is to be concerned with the intrinsically good and just as well as the instrumental.
Moreover, if, as G. E. Moore's theory entails, moral goodness is a realistic, primitive ethical predicate the same for all knowers, it follows that the intrinsically good as known by one person is identical with the intrinsically good as known by any other, however much their instrumental moral and legal concepts for realizing this intrinsic goodness in particular cultures, legal systems and circumstances may vary. Forthwith Judge Hand's and the legal positivists' necessity for distinguishing between the morally good, relative to the particular evaluator, and the officially and legally just evaporates. This permits one to identify the intrinsically just in law with the intrinsically good in morals. Then law and its justice become conceived, as they were by both Felix Cohen and his father, Morris Cohen, as the quest for the morally good life, where "good" means Moore's intrinsic moral goodness.
The lawyer's concept of the sanction for law then undergoes a sea-change. Instead of it being, as in Austin's famous definition of "laws, . . . properly so-called,"''2 the physical power of the sovereign to bring absolute pain or evil to bear on those who dissent from his commands, it is the intrinsic moral goal value of law which sanctions the policeman's use of his physical club. Thus, the policeman can be tried and condemned for murder if, in the use of his over-12. AUSTIN Furthermore, if intrinsic legal justice is identical in meaning with intrinsic moral goodness for the particular individual, as is the case when "intrinsically good" has a realistic epistemological meaning the same for all knowers, then the fact that, in any legal system, its norms are obligatory for everyone in the system becomes meaningful. In short, legal induction presents no problem for anyone holding this intuitive theory of ethics and law. Therefore, when one interprets the meaning of intrinsic goodness after the manner of G. E. Moore, not merely morals but also law become altered accordingly.
Kant provided independent confirmation of a similar conclusion. In his Critique of Pure Reason he gave a philosophical analysis of the descriptive language of Newtonian mathematical physics and also of Western common sense. This analysis showed that both contain two different kinds of meaningful words. One kind is that noted in Locke's Essay and analytically designated above in the linguistic premise (lEp)RE of Judge Hand's Austinian legal positivism. Kant called meaning given in this way "a posteriori" The writer calls concepts, the entire meaning of which is of this kind, "concepts by intuition,"'4 where by "intuition" is meant the direct sensing or immediate experiencing of something entirely empirical. (G. E. Moore's intuitively known "good," being nonempirical, is not, therefore, a concept by intuition in the writer's sense of these words.)
The other type of meaning which Kant noted to be present in Newton's physics is theoretically introduced, being brought by the scientist or observer as knower to the observed a posterior data. Kant called concepts, the entire meaning of which is of this kind, "a priori." The writer, in order to leave open the question whether they are (a) Kantian categorical, (b) neo-Kantian merely hypothetical or (c) logically realistic,'5 indirectly and pragmatically tested, theoretical constructs, calls them "concepts by postulation that are concepts by intellection.'s The latter clause is added to express the fact that, being syntactically constructed, these concepts are imageless and hence nonempirical apart from their "epistemic correlations,'7 or "rules of correspondence"''8 with a posterior data. In Kant's interpretation, (a) just above, gives his idealistic epistemological theory of descriptive knowledge. It also enabled him, and Kelsen after him, to find the meaning of normative words in the 13. GOODHART theoretically introduced constructs, thereby explaining why the radically empirical "is," which is the object of the normative judgment, can never give an "ought." Thus, Kant avoided the naturalistic fallacy, at least in the form in which it occurs in Locke's Essay, and in Hume, Bentham and Judge Hand's Austinian legal positivism.
As articulated by Kant, the result was his "categorical imperative" in morals and his formal theory of law. Immediately it no longer was a mystery why it is an inescapable fact of anyone's moral experience, as G. E. Moore showed by his "open question" argument,'9 that the moral question whether one should do what is most pleasant or something else is a genuinely meaningful one as it cannot be if the meaning of the word "good" is identical with that of the word "pleasant."
Although the present account of the source and content of Kant's imageless scientific constructs is different from what he supposed, the fact that they exist and do not reduce to the concepts by intuition referring entirely to empirical data is now generally recognized by physicists and philosophers of physics such as Einstein, Professor Henry Margenau, Ernest Nagel, the writer and even today's logical positivists.20 The logical positivists' acceptance of the irreducibility of concepts by postulation to concepts by intuition is especially convincing, because in their initial radically empirical period of Rudolf Carnap's Der Logische Aufbau Der Welt and their middle naive realistic period of von Neurath's "physicalism" they gave the very strong impression they believed the contrary.
The remarkable thing about Kant's theory of morals and law is that it used the concept of law to define even the personally good. By contrast, in both Bentham's radically empirical, introspective, psychological theory and G. E. Moore's nonempirical, intuitive theory, the meaning of the moral word "good" is identified with an atomistic property. Being atomistic, it entailed nothing other than itself in one's own or any other person's moral experience. In short, the idea of law was not in it. This is why Bentham's atomistic "good" tended to make morals, economics, law and politics laissez faire and relative to the introspections of the private person. It is also why G. E. Moore, even when he arbitrarily assumed that his atomistic, nonempirical property, "good," is identical for all knowers, could provide no criterion for saying when it is true to predicate it of anything. Consequently, even if this good exists, it is morally and legally useless.
Applied to law, both of the atomistic theories of the meaning of normative words have another fatal weakness. As Hume noted, the senses do not give us the idea of law. its lawfulness; only a theory which conceives of at least some of the words of its language as theoretically introduced constructs can do so. This Kant saw. The remarkable thing, however, is that he also saw that it is as true for personal morals as it is for law. This occurred in his "categorical imperative" which requires one to judge the goodness of one's conduct from the theoretically conceived standpoint of what it would look like were it a universal law of conduct practiced by everybody. That this is not the empty formula many critics, ignorant or unmindful of theoretical constructs in science, have tried to make it out to be, is shown by the following more concrete question which anyone must ask himself if he accepts this moral theory. This question is: Would I like it if what I now introspect to be the most pleasant thing to do to my neighbor John Brown were done by him to me? If the answer to this question is No, the categorical imperative requires me to conclude morally that however pleasing such conduct would be either for me or for the majority of people, such conduct is bad.
In order to see why the extension of the scientific language of constructs from the natural sciences to morals and law, which occurred in Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and his Philosophy of Law, leads to such a moral and legal theory, let us compare Kant's conception of these constructs in the natural sciences with the contemporary conception. For Kant, what distinguished "concepts by postulation" from "concepts by intuition" is that the former, unlike the latter, were characterized by Allgemeinheit (universality) and Notwendigkeit (necessity).
By Notwendigkeit he meant that the constructs which the scientist and also the person of common sense, as knower, theoretically introduce are necessities of his thinking; he has no choice but to think about the a posterior data given through the senses in this way. At the time Kant reached this conclusion it was by no means absurd or unreasonable. His reading of Hume, he tells us, awoke him from his "dogmatic slumbers" by making him aware of the concepts by intuition to which our common-sense beliefs and Newton's physics would have to restrict themselves, if concepts by intuition were the only meaningful concepts that exist. Being an expert creative mathematical physicist who knew the technical meaning of the concepts in Newton's physics,21 Kant realized that its theoretical meaningful words and mathematical symbols were of a quite different kind. Since these theoretically introduced, meaningful concepts are not given to the scientist as knower through his senses nor definable in terms of such a posteriori concepts by intuition, Kant concluded that they must be brought as necessities of the knower's thinking to the data given through the senses, precisely in the manner in which today the logic built into a calculating machine is a necessity of its procedure in calculating with respect to the a posterior information fed into the machine through its physical "sense" organs. We now know that this Kantian thesis that concepts by postu- With respect to the Allgemeinheit of these theoretical constructs, Kant is still correct. As any theoretical physicist knows, the experimentally verified, mathematically constructed, imageless laws of mathematical physics are always characterized by being preceded by universally quantified entity variables. Applied to law, therefore, Kant's theory had no difficulty in solving the aforementioned problem of legal induction. This is the case because these theoretical constructs are what Earl Russell has called "incomplete symbols." This does not mean that their meaning is partial or ambiguous or in any way incomplete. What it means, instead, is that unlike the concepts by intuition of a radically empirical or a naive realistic theory of the meaning of all words, an "incomplete symbol" has no meaning if treated in isolation, apart from the imageless axioms or postulates in terms of which its theoretical meaning is constructed and completely specified. Since such axioms are what we mean by laws and such lawfully constructed entities have no meaning other than what their axioms assign to them, it follows that such laws hold for all instances of their entity variables. Hence, such constructs are characterized by Allgemeinheit.
When the discovery was made that there are other geometries than that of Euclid and hence that there is more than one "form of sensibility" space and that there are alternative "logics," it was revealed that the "categories" which Kant supposed to be a priori are merely hypothetical. Epistemic correlation of their respectively deduced consequences with a posterior data is thus required to make the crucial experiments possible by means of which one operationally determines which of the hypothetical possibilities is the empirically confirmed one. The result of this discovery was neo-Kantianism. Applied to law, somewhat uncritically as the following will show, this gave the legal positivism of Kelsen.
As define away and cannot be derived from any merely empirical "is," be it that of Hobbes materialistic public club or the "preferences, arbitrary and imperative" of Holmes and Judge Hand. Therefore, "ought-to-be-ness" is for Kelsen a primitive presupposition of any legal system. To hope to understand law by regarding it as merely an empirical science concerned with causal relations between nonnormatively described events is, consequently, to attempt the impossible. Hence Holmes' famous dictum, that by law he means nothing more than the modest prediction of what the judge will do, rests on the error of confusing (1) the nonnormative relation of causality with (2) the quite different normative relation of imputative "ought-to-be-ness" between (a) the positive legal rules of the particular legal system, (b) the judge in his official capacity, subject to the procedural and substantive restraints of these rules, and (c) the defendant being judged in a particular case. This is the point of Kelsen's classic paper, "Causality and Imputation."23 Item (b) in this imputative relation is important. As Professor Alf Ross of the University of Copenhagen, who differs with Kelsen on other points, has noted, the extreme American legal realism of Gray and the Jerome Frank of Law and the Modern Mind committed the additional error of failing to distinguish between (i) what the judge does in his official capacity and (ii) the same thing done unofficially, i.e., the same judgment of the same case made, let us say, by the judge over cocktails in his club.24 Only what the judge does officially is law. But to make a judgment officially is not merely to make it qua its character as a nonnormatively described and perhaps causally predictable event, but to make it subject to the presupposed imputative ought-to-be-ness of the norms of the particular positive legal system of which one is a part, which ought-to-be-ness the judge explicitly accepts in his oath of office and which every youth implicitly accepts when he or she becomes of age to take on complete citizenship.
From this, Kelsen concludes that law is a science but not, even in part, a science referring to nonofficial and nonnormative empirical data. It is the science which has as its first premise, or Grundnorm, the lawful ought-to-beness which any legal system whatever presupposes, and has as its second premise the neo-Kantian hypothetical, theoretically introduced, substantive normative content of the "First Constitution" of the legal system in question. Law then is the science which presupposes this first premise, and empirically determines the substantive content of both the second premise and what subsequent official, positive, normative legislative statutes and judicial judgments have occurred within the authorizations given by the norms of the First Constitution. In short, as Professor Alf Ross has noted, law for Kelsen is the positive science of such sollen (i.e., ought-to-be) sentences. Because of the second premise, to say of any object of legal judgment that "x is just or unjust" is always to presuppose the particular legal system in which the judgment is made. Hence, as with Austinian legal positivism, it is self-contradictory and therefore meaningless to talk about the particular legal system as a whole being just or unjust. Professor H. L. A. Hart gives expression to this thesis when he analyzes A's right with respect to B in a particular legal document in terms of "There exists a legal system...." 25 It is in this sense of equating law with the empirical science of the positive law that it is correct to refer to both Kelsen's theory of law and that of Austin, Hobbes and Judge Hand as "legal positivism." Both theories are legally positivistic in the sense that law is conceived as nothing but the empirical science of the positive law and in the more concrete sense that to judge anything to be just is equivalent to affirming that it is in accord with the positive law. From this it follows that it is self-contradictory and hence meaningless to talk about the positive law itself being legally unjust.
Kelsen is not a legal positivist, however, in the linguistic or epistemological, as distinct from the positive legal, sense of the word "positivism." In other words, because of his neo-Kantianism and its constructs, he rejects the thesis of Austin and Hand, deriving from Locke's Essay, that the meaning of the moral word "good" or the legal expression "officially just" must be identified with, or defined in terms of, radically empirical data. The reason, let it be repeated, is twofold. First, the radical empiricist, Hume, as well as Kant, has made it clear that no "ought" can be derived from an empirical "is." Hence the idea of legal obligation must be taken as a primitive concept in positive legal science. Second, legal language contains constructs, i.e., concepts by postulation as well as concepts by intuition.
This has the following effect upon the legal syllogism of the judge's judgment. Under the Austinian version of legal positivism, the judicial syllogism contains only three propositions.
First premise: the norms of the positive law are such and such. Second premise: the facts of the case show the defendant's conduct to be incompatible with the first premise.
Conclusion: ergo, the defendant is guilty. Kelsen noted, however, that if the normative words in the first premise identify with, or are defined in terms of, nonnormative words, as is the case with Austinianism, then the first premise refers only to a nonnormative "is." Since the second premise does the same, there is no "ought" word in either premise. Consequently, the obligation of the defendant to be judged by the norms of the positive law, which the conclusion assumes, does not follow since not even two "is" sentences can give an "ought" sentence. Kelsen realized, therefore, that two things must be accepted. First, the normative words of the first premise cannot be identified with, or defined in terms of, nonnormative "is" words. Second, a third premise-the norms of the positive law ought to be obeyed- We have just noted that Kelsen's solution derives from Kant's observation that an adequate theory not merely of law, but also of morals, entails the idea of law, that is, the idea of the person judging himself in terms of a law which is the same for all persons. When his neo-Kantianism led Kelsen to regard ought-to-be-ness as merely a hypothetical maxim relative to the particular cultural and legal system, rather than a categorical imperative, then legal justice became relative also. This makes it meaningless to say that the positive law, for example, of the Hitlerian German legal system is less just than that of Adenauer's Germany even though the moral judgment of persons in both legal systems was and is to the contrary. Hence, for Kelsen and Professor H. L. A. Hart, as well as for Judge Hand's Austinian legal positivism, morals and law are two different things.
Felix Cohen, it will be recalled, solved the problem of legal induction as follows: First, appealing to G. E. Moore's distinction between intrinsic and instrumental values, he drew the distinction in law between instrumental and intrinsic legal justice. Second, he defined intrinsic legal justice in terms of moral goodness, where "goodness" means G. E. Moore's nonempirical, and not further analyzable, ethical property. Because Moore's realistic theory of the meaning of words entails that "good" is the same for all knowers anywhere, it followed that Cohen's definition of intrinsic legal justice (the goal of any legal system as distinct from its instrumental legal concepts) in terms of Moore's moral property "good" entails a meaning for the intrinsic, or goal value, part of law which is the same for all persons and therefore meaningfully prescriptive, not merely for everyone in the legal system, but anyone anywhere. This made it meaningful to judge legally the substantive normative content of one's own, or any other, legal system's positive law.
Furthermore, when Felix Cohen identified intrinsic legal justice, which the judge must use as his first premise in interpreting the legality of any legal language in deciding any case, with Moore's intrinsic, personal moral good-ness, the same for anyone anywhere, the standards of measurement for the judge's personal moral judgment and his official legal judgment become identical. Cohen concluded, therefore, that a careful analysis of what the words "law" and "morals" mean shows that the legally positivistic judge does not merely err when he conceives of himself as a schizophrenic moral Mr. Hyde and a legal Mr. Jekyll, but also, like schizophrenics generally, he deludes himself when he thinks that he does so. What actually happened with either the Austinian or Kelsenian judge, Cohen believed, was that inevitably, because of the normative ambiguities of positive legal language, he more or less unconsciously and surreptitiously slipped in outmoded and uncritically examined personal moral judgments in the name of merely declaring the positive law.
Nevertheless, Felix Cohen's own legal theory gives us reasons for doubting that this intuitive theory of law and morals and its method of solving the problem of legal induction is the correct one. This becomes evident when one notes (1) what he says about the moral dangers in Moore's intuitive theory of the meaning of the word "good" and (2) the restrictions which he placed upon Moore's theory in order to avoid these dangers.
The danger in any intuitive theory of morals or law is that when one's normative judgment becomes thus freed from any further empirical test or theoretical analysis, bigotry and the spirit of the inquisitor is likely to arise. To prevent this, Cohen required that, before the word "good" is predicated of any object of moral or legal judgment, the resulting proposition be subjected to the test of Bentham's hedonistic principle-"the greatest pleasure of the greatest number of people." But Cohen avoided the naturalistic fallacy only by recommitting it again, since Bentham's theory is the thesis that the meaning of the word "good" is identical with the meaning of the word "pleasure." The second defect in any theory of law that is based on Moore's way of avoiding the naturalistic fallacy is that it fails to achieve what Moore intended it to achieve, namely, to keep the normative sentences of morals and law cognitive; that is, sentences of which it is meaningful to say that they are true or false. If, as the naturalistic fallacy shows, normative assertions are synthetic statements, then isn't it the case that the test of their truth or falsity must be empirical? But Moore's theory of the meaning of the word "good" is that it refers to nothing empirical. Consequently, the test cannot be empirical.
The only escape would seem to be that any meaningfully true sentence with the word "good" as its predicate is known to be true because the sentence is a synthetic a priori proposition. But this requires Kant's categorically a priori idealistic epistemology and theory of language for its validity, whereas Moore's theory of knowledge, as we have noted, was naive realistic. Moreover, Felix Cohen, so far as the writer has been able to discover, did not believe there were any synthetic a priori propositions in either the normative or the natural sciences. Otherwise there would be no need to appeal to Bentham's hedonism to determine whether it was cognitively warrantable to predicate the word "good" of anything.
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The third defect in Moore's way of avoiding the naturalistic fallacy is that, were his nonempirical intuitive theory of the meaning of the word "good" correct, which in his realistic interpretation of its meaning makes "good" the same for all persons, it is difficult to understand the evident fact that one person affirms an object of moral judgment to be good whereas another person affirms that same object to be bad. If the meaning of the word "good" is identical for both and if it is a realistic predicate of the object, then such predications by different people should not occur. We conclude, therefore, that this nonempirical intuitive theory of the meaning of normative words in both morals and law leaves meaningless the truth and falsity of legal and ethical judgments and hence fails to achieve the purpose for which it was introduced.
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the principle effect of G. E. Moore's demonstration that a fallacy occurs if the meaning of any normative word is identified with, or defined in terms of, any empirical fact has been to convince many contemporary philosophical analysts that he is correct in using the naturalistic fallacy to demonstrate that sentences of moral and legal language are synthetic but errs in his assumption that such synthetic sentences are true or false. Instead, the nonanalytic meanings of the predicate terms "good" and "legally just" are "emotive," "hortatory," "ejaculatory" or "persuasive." This theory of law and morals we shall call "normative noncognitivism." Its very able representatives are the English and American analytic philosophers A. J.
Ayer and Charles L. Stevenson in morals and value theory generally and Alf Ross in law.26
But if Ross is a legal noncognitivist, why does he agree with Kelsen on the point noted above with respect to the sollen (ought-to-be) sentences of positive law? The answer appears to be that this is but part of Ross's position. Whereas Kelsen thinks that law is nothing but the positive science of such sollen sentences in a particular legal system, Ross recognizes also the unofficial sein (nonnormative "is"). Because of the normative ambiguities in official legal language and because it is analyzed by and applied to people who are not perfect official "ought-to-be's," the all-too-human, unofficial sein factor plays an important role in law, and it is the great merit of the American legal realists to have seen this. Their only error occurred when some of them went to the opposite extreme from Kelsen, by attempting to make law nothing but the empirical science of the unofficial nonnormative "is." When the late Karl Llewellyn,27 the pioneer in American legal realism, told us that his early emphasis upon the study of what judges actually do in fact, as well as the official reasons they give for what they do, never entailed the rejection of the equal importance of the "ought" of the official positive law, his version of American legal realism may well be very close to that of Professor Ross. In any event, Ross's position is that an adequate theory of law must pay attention to its unofficial sein as well as to its official sollen part and hence must combine American legal realism with Kelsen's legal positivism. He notes, however, that this is by no means easy. Kelsen's theory conceives of law as the science of official, normative sollen sentences. Extreme legal realism is the thesis that law is the science of unofficial nonnormative sein sentences. The combination of any two sciences is a science. Consequently, the combination of the American legal realists' science of sein sentences with Kelsen's science of sollen sentences must produce a legal science that is conceived of as the science of sein-sollen sentences. The result, however, as Ross shows, is not a science, but a theory of law that is self-contradictory.28
AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC (1948); STEVENSON, ETHICS AND LAN-
The proof that this is the case can be summarized as follows: If any one of these sein-sollen sentences is a scientific sentence, then it must be meaningful both theoretically and operationally to say that it is true or false. But, as we have shown above, such a sentence is synthetic-its normative sollen predicate meaning something other than its sein subject term. Thus the test of its truth must be either (a) empirical or (b) it is true a priori. Both the American legal realists and Kelsen, however, deny the existence of synthetic propositions that are true a priori. Therefore, the test must be empirical. But if this is the case, then to say that the synthetic sein-sollen sentence is true is to say that it must conform to some directly observable or indirectly confirmable empirical fact. The result, in the case of sein-sollen sentences which are empirically true, is to populate the universe with self-contradictory, Pickwickian fats normatifs 29 (nonnormative-normative facts), i.e., empirical facts which both are and are not what they are. For, if the empirical fait normatif is to confirm empirically the nonnormative American legal realistic sein portion of the sein-sollen sentence, it must be completely an unofficial nonnormative sein fact; whereas, if it is to confirm the Kelsenian official sollen portion of the sentence, it must not be this nonnormative sein fact, but what it ought to be. Hence, the Gurvitchean notion of fats normatifs, which is necessary to make the empirical test of these synthetic sein-sollen sentences meaningful, is a selfcontradictory notion. Consequently, the theory of law which conceives it as the science which results from combining the American legal realists' science of sein sentences with Kelsen's science of sollen sentences is a self-contradictory legal theory also.
As examples of such or similar legal theories which require the explicit or implicit self-contradictory notion of fats normatifs to justify their theory that the synthetic sein-sollen sentences of morals and laws are meaningfully true or false, Alf Ross cites not merely Gurvitch but also the non-neo-Kantian followers of Kant. The Hegelian and Marxist identification of the historical "ought-to-be" with the inevitable "is," is another example. Among Americans, Professor Lon Fuller's empirical "is-ought" facts, which he will not allow Pro- fessor Ernest Nagel to analyze into a nonnormative "is" fact which is empirical and "ought" factor which must be separated from it if confusion is not to occur, would appear to be another example. 30 Nevertheless, Ross maintains that these moral philosophers and lawyers are the only ones among traditional theorists who see the two different factors in legal and moral experience for which any adequate theory must account. Their only error is their supposition that their own theory, with its explicit or implicit self-contradictory notion of faits normcatifs, is this adequate theory. He concludes therefore that (1) the theory of law which combines American legal realism with Kelsenian legal positivism and conceives the resulting synthetic sein-sollen sentences to be meaningfully true or false, i.e., cognitive scientific assertions, is a self-contradictory theory, and (2) nevertheless no theory of law is adequate unless it combines American legal realism with Kelsenian legal positivism.
But how are these two conclusions to be reconciled? Ross answers this question by pointing out that the contradiction of the faits normatifs version of the combination arises from assuming that its scientific sein-sollen sentences are meaningfully true or false. A non-self-contradictory combination of American legal realism and Kelsen's legal positivism is obtained, therefore, when one assumes that the normative sollen words in the synthetic sein-sollen sentences are hortatory, ejaculatory or persuasive rather than empirically cognitive in their meaning.31 Thus Ross's theory of law, which he extends to morals and to aesthetics also, is identical with the one arrived at by Professors Ayer and Stevenson.
That these noncognitivists are brilliant moral and legal theorists is evident. That they are correct on the following points is equally evident, as has been shown by the foregoing analysis of their own and other theories: (1) Sein-sollen sentences are synthetic. (2) To save the cognitive meaning of such synthetic sentences by thinking they refer to a sein-sollen fait normatif is a self-contradictory notion.
Even so, two things are the case: First, for all its merits, this noncognitive theory, when taken seriously in law or pursued to its logical consequences in either morals or law, has fatal defects. Second, there is an alternative theory of the combination of American legal realism with Kelsen's legal positivism which avoids the contradiction involved in the notion of fait normatif while also having the merit of keeping moral and legal sein-sollen sentences cognitive. This theory is that the empirical fact to which the sein subject term of the synthetic sein-sollen sentence refers for its cognitive empirical meaning is What this means concretely becomes evident when one notes that in such a community neither one's pleasures, approvals, preferences or assents, nor one's noncognitive ejaculations are relevant to one's moral, legal or religious rights and obligations. Instead, these rights, in at least a major part, are determined at birth by one's sex and family standing (e.g., primogeniture) and by the race of one's ancestors in their relation to the tribe and race of the first families of the nation. Webster's dictionary gives expression to the fact that the morals and law of all nations were originally of this Status type when it lists the word "tribe" as the first equivalent of the word "nation."
If, in such a nation, the race or the color of skin of one's ancestors is not that of the first families, then castes exist and one cannot expect one's moral, legal, religious or educational rights or duties to be equal to those of one's neighbor of a different color of skin who is a blood descendant of the first families. Moreover, even with the children of the first families, if the society is completely patriarchal, only sons will receive an education and among them only the eldest sons will receive the best education. The reason is that in such a society the best goes to those carrying the greatest responsibilities and these 32. NORTHROP We can best understand the reasons which led our ancient predecessors to believe in the morals, law and Judaic-Christianity of a law of Status community if we compare it with the legal philosophy of Judge Hand's Austinianism. The latter philosophy, we have noted, rests on radical empiricism with respect to the source of the meaning of all words and on radically empirical data of introspective psychology, such as pleasures, interests or approvals, with respect to the identification of the meaning of the words "good" and "bad" in personal morality. Thus, the legal positivist's concept of the person is that of the introspected flow-of-consciousness self of Hume and James, a purely private, moral and legal person in no way observable publicly. The moral and legal person in a law of Status legal community is the publicly sensed biological person. This means that the linguistic premise of a Status legal community is naive realism, the theory that the meaning of words refers to public objects and properties, the same for all knowers and that these public properties are sensed. In short, whereas the modern legal positivists identify the meaning of all normative words with the empirical data of introspective psychological science, the adherents of a Status law, morality and religion identify them with the naive realistic, publicly meaningful facts of natural history and biological science.
Clearly, there is nor a priori reason for choosing one of these identifications rather than the other. Either theory is arbitrary. Moreover, both theories commit the naturalistic fallacy.
The Status theory has the advantage, however, of making the meaning of all moral and legal words objective. Consequently, the morally good and the legally just are identical, and neither is relative to the evaluator. Also, because all values are tied to one's race, religion is essentially connected with one's ancestors. In the family, the religious symbol is the fire of the family hearth. In the nation, it is the tribal fire. Consequently, in such a morality and law, God tends to be conceived provincially as a God primarily of one's own tribe and its race. This connection between Status law and literature is revealed in the ancient Greek tragedies. Aeschylus in his Eumenides has Apollo say: "The mother of what is called her child is not its parent, but only the nurse of the newly implanted germ. The begetter is the parent. She, a stranger, doth but preserve the little creature, except God shall blight its birth."38 This statement affirms the norms of a patriarchal legal system and roots them in a theory of biological heredity. This genetic theory is that the inherited traits of the offspring are transmitted from generation to generation solely by the genes of the male line. Because of the identification of normative words with the facts of naive realistic biological science, it is then inferred that, since God made human beings this way, the obligation of the wife and daughters to accept the patriarchal authority of the male in family, church and state is absolute and the obligation of all to keep the patriarchal male line purely bred is equally a Divine duty and the Patriarch's Divine right.39
Why do those of us who have come heavily under the influence of modern philosophical, moral and legal thinking no longer believe this theory? One reason is that we now know the biological theory upon which it rests to be false. The female as well as the male contributes to the inherited traits of the children. This shows that the meanings of the normative words are not sui generis; in the language of G. E. Moore, they are not primitive, unanalyzable, intuitively given meanings. This means that our value judgments concerning second-order facts of human conduct are a function of our cognitive theory of first-order empirical facts in the nonnormative empirical sciences. Another reason, just noted, is that the Status theory is incorrect for precisely the same reason that the theory of Hume, Austin, Hobbes and Judge Hand is in error; it commits the naturalistic fallacy of identifying the meaning of the words "morally good" and "legally just" with some arbitrarily chosen empirical fact. Historically, however, the reason why we regard the Status theory as absurdly nonsensical, and both immoral and unjust, is the evolution of Western law which Sir Henry Maine has described as the "movement from Status to Contract." In what did this shift consist?
He tells us that it began in Roman law and that it "has been distinguished by the gradual dissolution of family dependency, and the growth of individual obligation in its place. The Individual is steadily substituted for the Family, as the unit of which civil laws take account."40 Very much more, however, is involved. Not only does the individual rather than the family, the tribe and the race become the legal person, but, in addition, he conceives of morals, law and even God in a novel way. Also, new technical legal concepts, such as jus in rem, are introduced. These concepts were made possible by the discovery and use in Greek mathematical physics of what above we called "constructs" The foregoing considerations have considerable contemporary importance. First, they show that the very prevalent attempt of "ordinary language" philosophers and lawyers to obtain an adequate analysis of the meaning of moral and legal words by exhibiting particular sentences of ordinary language "para- In saying that the ordinary language philosophers, who echo G. E. Moore and the later Wittgenstein, are doomed to failure, I do not mean that they are not in part correct or important; they are merely not all-important, because there is also, in both the natural and the normative sciences, the nonordinary language of constructs or concepts by postulation which the earlier Wittgenstein in his Tractatus called "perfect language." However, ordinary language, to the extent that it is correct or important, cannot be taken as exhibiting its meaning unambiguously in a "paradigmatic" example. This is the case only if ordinary language is interpreted in the radically empirical, rather than in the naive realistic meaning which it has for most ordinary people. The reason why we reject the naive realistic interpretation of ordinary language is that, as shown elsewhere,45 it is a self-contradictory, and hence a false, theory of the meaning of words. Our positive thesis, therefore, is that an adequate theory of the meaning of both nonnormative and normative language requires the concepts by postulation of the "perfect language" of the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus and "the ordinary language" interpreted completely in the radical empirical manner of the later Wittgenstein. In other words, as noted above, an adequate theory of morals and law requires the combination of a radically empirical (as distinct from a naive realistic law of Status) American legal realism with the legal constructs of Kelsen's legal positivism.
What is the meaning of the words intrinsically "good" or "bad" and intrinsically "just" or "unjust" in this theory?
The Cognitive Meaning of Is-Ought (Sein-Sollen) Sentences It is generally agreed by all informed and competent contemporary philosophical and legal analysts that, although Moore's intuitive theory is not the correct one, the issue has been sharply focused by him and turns around how one escapes what he called the naturalistic fallacy.
This fallacy, let it be recalled, is that if one identifies the meaning of any normative word, in the sense of intrinsically, rather than merely instrumentally, good or just with any empirical fact whatever, the result is a sentence which is a trivial tautology and this clearly is not what the sentence means. Moore noted also that the commission of the naturalistic fallacy closes questions that are clearly meaningfully open questions in anyone's moral experience. For example, if "x is good for me" is equivalent to "x is the most pleasant thing for me to do," then the following, obviously meaningful ques- It is to be noted, however, that this conclusion must be qualified or otherwise it would be meaningful to ask of the astronomical planets in their courses whether their conduct is good or bad. Certainly it is nonsense to say of the planets that, instead of moving, as "the facts of the case" show, in an orbit which is an ellipse, they ought to move in a pattern which is a rectangle, doing a "squads right" at each corner.
This consideration makes the following question also a cognitively meaningful one: Of what empirical nonnormative facts is it appropriate to affirm that what did occur ought not to have occurred? Clearly, it is the facts of human conduct. But this answer, though a necessary, is not a sufficient condition. Otherwise we would hold a person morally and the law would hold him legally responsible if his conduct were known by us or the court "beyond the possibility of a reasonable doubt" to be entirely the causal effect of a cancer in his brain and hence of a character such that his behavior was in no way subject to his voluntary control. Why is this the case?
Is it not because of the empirical fact that there is also human conduct which is in part, at least, the causal effect of prepositionally held beliefs, freely assented to and for which, therefore, a person is morally and legally responsible? In other words, it is meaningless and nonsensical to talk about the conduct of planets, stones or doorknobs being good or bad, or of them behaving in a way in which they ought not to have done, because their conduct is not a causal effect of their freely-assented-to-propositional beliefs concerning what a planet, a stone or a doorknob is and what the other first-order facts of their natural environment are. In short, a planet is not a freely assenting, proposition-entertaining natural object, whereas a human being is.46 This tells us both why it is a fallacy to identify the meaning of any normative word either with any empirical fact or to what its cognitive meaning refers.
The naturalistic fallacy is a fallacy because facts merely are, and it is as nonsensical to talk about them being good or bad as it is to talk about them being true or false, except in the case (and the exception is the heart of the matter) of those facts of human conduct which are in part at least the causal effect of freely-assented-to beliefs and commitments of the person indulging in the conduct.
What normative words refer to, as the source of their cognitive meaning, therefore, is freely-assented-to propositional beliefs. They are meaningfully predicated only of those empirical facts of human conduct which are in part The question now arises: What is the criterion for determining when it is correct in sein-sollen sentences to say that such second-order factual human conduct is morally good and legally just or morally bad and legally unjust? If our thesis that sein-sollen sentences are cognitive is meaningful, then this criterion, as we showed above, must be an empirical one. This means that it must refer to nonnormative empirical facts. Otherwise we would both beg the question and fall into the self-contradictory notion of faits normatifs.
The answer to this crucial question becomes evident when one asks the further question: What other facts than second-order facts are there? Our answer is "first-order facts," where by such nonnormative first-order facts we mean all those facts about oneself and the rest of the natural universe which are not causal effects of the beliefs of people. Our empirical criterion, therefore, of when it is correct to predicate the sollen words "ought," "good" and "legally just" of second-order facts is the following: That second-order factual human conduct is personally good and legally just in the sense of what ought to be, when this second-order factual conduct is the causal effect of that freelyassented-to propositional belief about first-order factual man and nature, which is empirically confirmed to be more probably true than alternative theories. That second-order factual human conduct is personally bad, legally unjust and not what ought to be, to the extent that it is the causal effect of freely-assented-to propositional beliefs in nonnormative psychology and natural science which, when put to an empirical test cognitively, are not confirmed with a higher degree of probability than any alternative theory. Of two such theories, to say that one is empirically confirmed with a higher degree of probability than another is equivalent to saying that the more probable theory entails all the empirical facts entailed by the less probable theory and at least one directly inspectable empirical fact which should not be present were the less probable theory true.
It remains to indicate (1) the conception of the judicial review of majorityapproved legislative statutes and (2) the relation between law and morals that this theory entails. Since, according to this theory, there is no meaning to any normative word, be it moral or legal, except as it refers to second-order factual human conduct which is the causal effect in whole or part of the freely-assented-to beliefs of the individual person being morally and legally judged, it follows that any legislative statute which in its substantive content makes it a crime for a person to freely entertain and assent to one or another religious or secular belief, by making the holding of one of them a crime, is self-contradictory. In short, given the sein fact without which a normative word is meaningless, the principle of religious and civil liberties is analytic and hence tautologically true. We conclude, therefore, that Kelsen, H. L. A. Hart and other moral, legal and cultural relativists are in error when they affirm that all the rules of any possible morals and law are hypothetical imperatives, relative to the particular legal system, culture or person in question. At this point we agree with Kant when he affirms that there is at least one categorical imperative and with Felix Cohen and Lon Fuller (in the latter's exchange with Professor Hart)47 in their thesis that it is legally, as well as morally, meaningful to say that the substantive content of the sollen sentences of the positive law of any legal system is unjust. These sentences are unjust if they violate the freedom of assent of the individual to his own propositional beliefs without which any normative word, be it moral or legal, is meaningless.
But the right to entertain and freely assent to propositional beliefs is not the only analytically true categorical imperative. For the expression "propositional belief" is as essential to the sein cognitive reference and meaning of any moral or legal word as is the expression "freely assented to." This tells us that even though the principle of religious and civil liberties is a necessary condition, it is not a sufficient one for judging any person's or any positive legal system's second-order factual conduct and content to be morally good or legally just; what is assented to or written into the substantive content of the First Constitution is equally important. It tells us, in other words, what Justice Holmes with his notion of "clear and present danger" and other liberal democrats have had to recognize-the sein fact, namely, that even though the principle of religious and civil liberties is a categorical imperative, it is not absolute.
The reason, however, is not the a posteriori one given by Holmes, and by Kant in his Philosophy of Law when he said that no legal system can allow itself to be destroyed, since no a posterior fact can upset a categorical imperative, as Kant should have remembered from his earlier works. Also, if, as our theory entails, no "ought" word is meaningful unless the propositional belief to which one freely assents is empirically or analytically verifiable, then any positive legal system, the substantive content of whose First Constitution expresses a propositional belief which can be shown on either analytic or empirical grounds to be cognitively false, ought to be destroyed by even its own people when they find this to be the case. The reason why the principle of religious and civil liberties is not absolute is, therefore, that there is another analytically true categorical imperative as well-the categorical imperative that we ought to assent only to propositional beliefs which can be shown on either analytical or empirical grounds by appeal to first-order facts to be true or more probably true, in the sense indicated earlier, than any alternative theory.
Elsewhere,48 reasons have been given for believing that "law of Contract" legal systems, to the extent that their language is that of constructs, entail another analytically true categorical imperative. Moreover, although analytically (1) (p) (x) : x is intrinsically just: = : x is an instance of a syntactically constructed logically realistic relation R such that: (i) (p) R, and (ii) (p) s of R, where x is the behavior of p or the object of any moral or legal judgment and s is the substantive content of R.
Expressed in ordinary language, interpreted logically realistically, this analytic expression is:
For any one person p and any one object of moral and legal judgment x, to say that x is intrinsically good and just is equivalent to saying that x instances a law R which is such that (i) R is universally quantified for all persons and (ii) the substantive content of R is also universally quantified for all persons.
Item (ii) is very important. It means that for any constitutional or legislative statute to be just, it is not enough, or even necessary, for it to be approved by the majority. Instead, justice means that if the statute in its substantive content assigns certain rights or obligations to one person p, or one class of people, oc, in the legal system, then any one must be substitutable for that person p, or the class of people oc, with respect to those rights and duties. Although defined completely formally without reference to sensed properties, this logical realistic theory of cosmopolitan morals, law and religion is by no means empty. In fact, it is the only theory, of which the writer's extensive reading has made him aware, that warrants the unanimous decisions of the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States in the desegregation cases when, as is the case, there is no federal congressional statute making it a crime for any state to have its segregated cultural customs and their corresponding positive segregative legislative educational statutes.
It can be shown also that all three analytically true categorical moral and legal imperatives were affirmed by the Greek and Roman Stoic mathematical physicists, lawyers and moral and religious philosophers and that the resulting "movement from Status to Contract," which is the history of the evolution of Western law-a movement now, thanks to the American Declaration of Independence, embracing the world-is the working out of these three categorical imperatives in history. More specifically, it can be shown that ( 
